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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 




This appeal concerns a procedural challenge to the 
Pennsylvania Department of Public Welfare's ("Department") 
promulgation of revised regulations governing payment 
rates for prescription drugs and related services provided to 
Medicaid recipients pursuant to Title XIX of the Social 
Security Act, 42 U.S.C. SS 1396-1396v ("Medicaid Act").1 
The Department appeals from an order and judgment of the 
United States District Court for the Eastern District of 
Pennsylvania, entered August 31, 1998, enjoining it from 
applying revised formulas to pay pharmacies for 
prescription drugs and related services under the Medicaid 
program which were to become effective October 1, 1995. 
Rite Aid of Pennsylvania and the Pennsylvania Pharmacists 
Association ("PPA") cross-appeal from the district court's 
order to the extent that it upheld procedures the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. In order to assist the readers of this opinion, we set forth the letter 
abbreviations that the parties have used which we also use: Average 
Wholesale Price (AWP); Estimated Acquisition Cost (EAC); Federal Upper 
Limit (FUL); Health Care Financing Administration (HCFA); Department 
of Health and Human Services (HHS); Independent Regulatory Review 
Commission (IRRC); Medical Care Advisory Committee (MAAC); 
Maximum Allowable Costs (MAC); Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act 
(OBRA); Pennsylvania Pharmacists Association (PPA); and State Plan 
Amendment (SPA). 
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Department followed in promulgating the regulations. See 
Rite Aid of Pennsylvania, Inc. v. Houstoun, 1998 WL 631966 
(E.D. Pa. Aug. 31, 1998). The district court exercised 
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. SS 1331, 1343 and we exercise 
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. S 1291. For the reasons that 
follow, we will reverse the order and judgment and dismiss 
the cross-appeals. 
 
II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
 
A. Statutory and Regulatory Background. 
 
Medicaid is a cooperative state-federal program through 
which the federal government provides funds to the states 
to assist the poor, elderly, and disabled to receive medical 
care. 42 U.S.C. S 1396. See Cleary v. Waldman, 1999 WL 
53046, at *3 (3d Cir. Feb. 8, 1999). The Medicaid Act 
requires states to pay for certain services and allows them 
to provide additional services. 42 U.S.C. S 1396a(a)(10); 42 
C.F.R. SS 440.210-440.225. The states, in accordance with 
federal law, establish eligible beneficiary groups, types and 
ranges of service, payment levels for services, and 
administrative and operating procedures and make 
payment for services directly to the individuals or entities 
furnishing the services. 42 C.F.R. S 430.0. The Department 
is the state agency responsible for the administration of 
Pennsylvania's version of Medicaid. 
 
States that choose to participate in Medicaid must 
submit a State Plan to the United States Department of 
Health and Human Services ("HHS") for approval. The State 
Plan describes the policy and methods used to set payment 
rates for each type of service included in the program. See, 
e.g., Wilder v. Virginia Hosp. Ass'n, 496 U.S. 498, 502, 110 
S.Ct. 2510, 2511 (1990). The state also must submit any 
subsequent proposed amendment (State Plan Amendment, 
or "SPA") to the HHS for approval. The amendment, of 
course, must meet federal requirements. 42 U.S.C. 
SS 1396a(b); 42 C.F.R. SS 430.10, 430.12. Pennsylvania law 
requires that the Pennsylvania Independent Regulatory 
Review Commission ("IRRC") review and approve the 
Department's proposed amendments before the Department 
seeks HHS approval. Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 71, #8E8E # 745.1 to 
745.15 (West 1990). 
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Pennsylvania has opted to cover prescription drugs and 
related services in its State Plan. 42 U.S.C. S 1396d(a)(12); 
42 C.F.R. S 440.120(a). Federal legislation controls program 
costs for Medicaid prescription drug benefits by 
establishing upper limits, or Maximum Allowable Costs 
("MACs"), for certain drugs. Certain generic drugs are 
reimbursed at the Federal Upper Limit ("FUL") as mandated 
by the Health Care Financing Administration ("HCFA") of 
the HHS.2 For brand name drugs, states reimburse for the 
lower of the pharmacy's "usual and customary charges" or 
the Estimated Acquisition Cost ("EAC"), which is the state's 
best estimate of the price generally and currently paid by 
providers for a drug marketed or sold by a particular 
manufacturer. See 42 C.F.R. S 447.301. Prior to the 
adoption of the revisions at issue here, the Department 
defined the EAC as the full Average Wholesale Price ("AWP") 
for the drug as found in the Department's pricing services. 
 
Rite Aid and members of the PPA voluntarily participate 
as enrolled providers in the Pennsylvania Medical 
Assistance Program pursuant to provider agreements 
executed with the Department. See 55 Pa. Code. S 1121. 
The agreements provide for the Department to reimburse 
Rite Aid and other pharmacies for prescription drugs and 
related services in accordance with applicable federal and 
state laws and regulations. We detail here only those laws 
and regulations material to this appeal. 
 
Among such federal laws is 42 U.S.C. S 1396a(a)30(A) 
("section 30(A)"), which instructs that State Plans must 
 
       provide such methods and procedures relating to the 
       utilization of, and the payment for, care and services 
       available under the plan (including but not limited to 
       utilization review plans as provided for in section 
       1396b(i)(4) of this title) as may be necessary to 
       safeguard against unnecessary utilization of such care 
       and services and to assure that payments are 
       consistent with efficiency, economy, and quality of care 
       and are sufficient to enlist enough providers so that 
       care and services are available under the plan at least 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. By federal regulation, reimbursement for those generic drugs specified 
by HCFA may not exceed the FUL. 42 C.F.R. S 447.332. 
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       to the extent that such care and services are available 
       to the general population in the geographic area . .. 
 
If a state chooses to amend its State Plan, federal 
regulations require it to consult with a "medical care 
advisory committee" ("MAAC"), which will advise the state 
agency director. See 42 C.F.R. S 431.12(b). The committee 
must "have an opportunity for participation in policy 
development and program administration, including 
furthering participation of recipient members in agency 
programs." Id. S 431.12(e). As set forth above, the state also 
must submit an SPA for approval by the HHS through the 
HCFA. See 42 C.F.R. S 430.12(c)(ii). The HCFA must act on 
the SPA within 90 days of submission or it is approved 
automatically. See 42 U.S.C. S 1396n(f)(2); 42 C.F.R. 
S 430.16. Federal statutes and regulations establish the 
criteria for the HCFA to make its decision. See 42 C.F.R. 
S 430.15(a). 
 
Among other regulations affecting state payment rates 
under section 30(A) is a requirement for public notice for 
changes in "methods and standards for setting payment 
rates for services" before the effective date of the change. 42 
C.F.R. S 447.205. The regulation requires notice of both the 
"proposed change" and of the final change within 60 days 
of its becoming effective, providing a period for public 
comment and criticism. Id. Pennsylvania regulations 
require a 60-day public comment period in accordance with 
42 C.F.R. S 447.205. See 55 Pa. CodeS 1101.70.3 
 
B. Pennsylvania Pharmacy Reimbursement Regulations. 
 
The Department must create formulae and rates to 
govern two components of prescription drug and services 
reimbursement. First, it determines what the pharmacies 
will receive for the ingredient cost of the drugs; second, it 
determines a "dispensing fee": a per-prescription payment 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. The state regulation provides: 
 
       Federal regulations at 42 C.F.R. 447.205 require the Department 
       . . . to give a 60 day public notice of proposed Statewide changes 
in 
       any method or level of MA [Medical Assistance] reimbursement that 
       would affect program expenditures by 1% or more during the 12 
       months following the effective date of the change. 
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which compensates pharmacies for the costs associated 
with dispensing a prescription to a Medicaid recipient. 
 
Prior to the October 1, 1995 rate revisions, the 
Department reimbursed pharmacies for the ingredient cost 
for brand name drugs at the AWP. For generic drugs, the 
formula follows the state MAC guidelines. (The pre-1995 
state MAC guidelines were set at the 70th percentile price 
of those drugs found in the United States Department of 
Health Generic Drug Formulary, an instrument which no 
longer exists.) The dispensing fee was $3.50 per- 
prescription. 
 
Pennsylvania had good reason to revise these rates. For 
several years prior to 1994, the HCFA had been advising 
the Department that its reimbursement rates were high, 
given, among other reasons, changes in the drug 
marketplace. See, e.g., letter from HCFA to Secretary of 
Public Welfare, John F. White, Jr., (Nov. 27, 1990). App. at 
1881. The HCFA informed the Department that it would not 
accept AWP levels for "EAC without a significant discount 
being applied," unless the Department provided 
documentation that the actual acquisition cost equaled the 
full AWP. Id.4 Furthermore, at the end of 1994, a three-year 
moratorium imposed by federal law which prevented the 
Department from amending its pharmacy reimbursement 
formulae was due to expire. See 42 U.S.C.S 1396r-8(e)(1). 
 
Thus, in September 1994, the Department proposed to 
modify pharmacy reimbursements by requiring pharmacies 
to charge the Department the lowest rate they charged any 
other third-party payor, including private insurers. The 
proposal was forwarded to the pharmacy subcommittee of 
the MAAC, and sent to the Governor's Budget Office as a 
plan to save the State approximately $21.4 million for the 
fiscal year 1995-96 (July 1-June 30). The Governor 
included the projected savings in the State's budget, 
although the Department had not yet secured approval for 




4. The HCFA noted that the full AWP overstated the drug prices by as 
much as 10%-20% in some states, although it did not single out or 
discuss Pennsylvania in particular. Id. 
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Not surprisingly, pharmacies were concerned about the 
impact of the proposed cuts, and voiced many criticisms 
and suggestions. The MAAC and the pharmacy community 
stated that it was unreasonable for the Department to 
compare Medicaid to private, third-party payor plans, 
because, among other reasons, pharmacies face special 
costs in participating in the Medicaid program and serving 
Medicaid recipients. Among other alternatives, the 
pharmacies asked the Department to study "what it costs 
to fill a Medicaid prescription in Pennsylvania and allow a 
reasonable profit." Letter from the PPA to Secretary Feather 
O. Houstoun (May 12, 1995). App. at 1081. 
 
While considering the proposals discussion participants 
offered, the Department conducted its own review and 
evaluation, although it did not study what Medicaid 
provision of pharmaceutical services cost in Pennsylvania. 
The Department, however, delayed the anticipated 
implementation date of January 1, 1995, as it reviewed its 
alternatives. 
 
After postponing the revision's proposed effective date, 
the Department chose a new reimbursement structure: the 
EAC for brand name drugs would be cut to AWP-10%. For 
generic drugs with an FUL, the maximum acquisition cost 
was the FUL. For generic drugs for which the HHS has not 
determined an FUL, the Department adopted limits set by 
a private pricing service, "BaseLine Prices," to be revised 
every six months. The dispensing fee was raised from $3.50 
per-prescription to $4.00 per-prescription. The Department 
revised the definition of "usual and customary" to require 
pharmacies to reduce their usual and customary charge for 
a given prescription to include any discounts the pharmacy 
would have given the Medicaid recipient if the recipient had 
not been covered by Medicaid, i.e., as if they had paid cash 
or been covered by a third-party payor. 
 
The Department considered such information as state 
pharmacy licensing laws and OBRA counseling 
requirements,5 and input from the MAAC and its pharmacy 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. Specifically, Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 63, SS 390-1 to 390-9, and 49 Pa. 
Code 
S 27.19 (requiring pharmacists to offer to conduct a "Prospective Drug 
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subcommittee. It also sought other data, such as the 
geographical distribution of independent and chain 
drugstores throughout the state and participation rates of 
other third-party plans. 
 
The Department primarily relied upon the following data: 
(1) reimbursement rates provided by 13 third-party payors 
for brand name drugs in Pennsylvania for approximately 
200 private plans operating in the state; (2) reimbursement 
rates for brand name drugs paid by neighboring states, 
HCFA Region III states and other states with high Medicaid 
expenditures;6 and (3) purchase prices of 15 highly-used, 
randomly selected drugs, reviewed by Joseph Concino 
("Concino"), the Department's Medical Assistance Policy 
Specialist on Pharmacy. Concino showed that the 
pharmacies could purchase almost every one of the selected 
drugs at or below the FUL rate. He found that the state's 
pre-1995 rates were higher than any of the third-party 
payors' rates, and that the proposed change -- from AWP to 
AWP-10%, and from a dispensing fee of $3.50 to $4.00-- 
also would provide higher rates than those of third-party 
payors. 
 
Among other findings, the Department learned in its 
review that Pennsylvania was fifth in the nation for 
Medicaid program expenditures, and that it was the only 
state surveyed that did not use FULs as the cost limit for 
generic drugs. It was one of just four states using the full 
AWP for brand name drugs, had the highest rate of 
Medicaid payments for Region III states, and the highest 




Review" to ensure that drug will not have adverse result for patient). 
Further, under federal law, Medicaid State Plans must include a 
Prospective Drug Review requirement, 42 U.S.C. S 1396r-8(g)(2). OBRA is 
the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act, 42 U.S.C.S 1396r-8(g)(2) 
(regulating pharmacies). 
 
6. HCFA Region III states include Delaware, the District of Columbia, 
Maryland, Pennsylvania, Virginia, and West Virginia. The Department 
also surveyed California, Florida, Illinois. Louisiana, Michigan, New 
Jersey, New York, Ohio, and Texas. 
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On August 8, 1995, the Department submitted the 
amended regulations to the IRRC, which received comments 
during its review, and presented the Department with a 
series of questions, to which the Department replied in 
writing. The Department published a notice on August 26, 
1995, in the Pennsylvania Bulletin, 25 Pa. Bull. 3540 (Aug. 
26, 1995) stating that the Department "will amend" the 
reimbursement rates and provided a synopsis of the 
changes, and that copies of the notice (that is, the very 
same notice available at 25 Pa. Bull. 3540) would be 
available at local agencies throughout the Commonwealth. 
After an IRRC public meeting with representatives of the 
Department, the public, and pharmacies present, the 
regulations were deemed approved by the IRRC on 
September 8, 1995, to take effect on October 1, 1995. On 
September 23, 1995, the text of the Department order 
adopting the regulations was published in the Pennsylvania 
Bulletin. See 25 Pa. Bull. 3978 (Sept. 23, 1995). In the 
order the Department stated that: 
 
       The MA (Medical Assistance) program cannot ignore the 
       trends occurring -- in other state Medicaid programs, 
       private third-party plans and reimbursement rates 
       accepted by Pennsylvania pharmacies. As a prudent 
       buyer of medical care for its clients, the Department 
       must obtain similar rates extended to those of other 
       third-party payors and other Medicaid agencies. 
       Therefore, to make the pharmacy payment policies for 
       the MA program comparable with other private and 
       public payment policies, the Department is adopting 
       the following revisions: . . . 
 
On December 29, 1995, the Department sent the SPA to 
the HCFA for approval. The HCFA approved the revised SPA 
on May 7, 1995, with changes effective retroactively to 
October 1, 1995.  
 
C. Procedural History. 
 
Rite Aid filed an action against the Secretary of the 
Department of Public Welfare on March 27, 1997, 
approximately 17 months after the revised regulation took 
effect. Rite Aid alleged that in adopting the revisions the 
Department had violated various provisions of Title XIX of 
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the Social Security Act and related regulations and state 
statutes, as well as the due process clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment. The parties filed cross-motions for 
judgment on the pleadings, and on November 3, 1997, the 
district court granted judgment in favor of the Department 
on Rite Aid's claim that the Department violated 42 C.F.R. 
S 447.205 by not publishing notice of the proposed change 
and by not providing a public comment period. 42 C.F.R. 
S 447.205(a) and (d)(1). In addition, the court granted the 
Department judgment on Rite Aid's due process claim. 
 
The court, however, ruled in favor of Rite Aid on its claim 
that section 30(A) contains a discrete "procedural" 
component and thus it denied the Department's motion for 
a judgment on the pleadings on that issue. It also upheld 
Rite Aid's claim that the Department violated 42 C.F.R. 
S 447.205(c)(4) by failing to identify a local agency where 
the proposed reimbursement changes were available for 
public review. Thus, it granted Rite Aid a judgment on the 
pleadings on that issue. Rite Aid of Pennsylvania, Inc. v. 
Houstoun, 998 F. Supp. 522 (E.D. Pa. 1997). 
 
On January 12, 1998, the PPA moved to intervene as a 
plaintiff; and the district court granted the motion on 
February 20, 1998. On May 8, 1998, the court, on Rite 
Aid's and the PPA's motion to define the scope of review 
and limit discovery, issued an opinion and order limiting its 
review of the Department's compliance with section 30(A) to 
the administrative record. Rite Aid of Pennsylvania v. 
Houstoun, 1998 WL 254082 (E.D. Pa. May 8, 1998). 
 
On August 31, 1998, the court granted Rite Aid's and the 
PPA's motion for summary judgment and denied the 
Department's motion for summary judgment. It found that 
the Department had violated section 30(A) because it acted 
arbitrarily and capriciously procedurally in adopting the 
revisions. Accordingly, it enjoined the Department from 
reimbursing pharmacies for drugs supplied to Medicaid 
recipients on or after October 1, 1998, in accordance with 
the rates in dispute. See Rite Aid of Pennsylvania, Inc. v. 
Houstoun, 1998 WL 631966 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 31, 1998). 
Moreover, it found that the Department did not comply with 
its obligations under 42 C.F.R. S 431.12 to meet with the 
MAAC to discuss the regulations. The court, however, did 
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not void the regulations on that ground. At the same time, 
the court rejected Rite Aid's and the PPA's claim that 
section 30(A) required the Department to conduct a study 
of actual pharmacy costs before revising the payment 
schedule. 
 
The Department filed a notice of appeal on September 8, 
1998, amended on September 28, 1998; Rite Aid and the 
PPA filed cross-appeals on September 29, 1998, challenging 
the district court's holding that section 30(A) did not 
require the Department to conduct a study of actual 
pharmacy costs, as well as its holding that the Department 
had not violated 42 C.F.R. S 447.205(a) by not publishing 
prior notice of the proposed changes. The district court and 
this court denied the Department's motions to stay the 
injunction by orders entered September 18, 1998, and 
October 26, 1998, respectively. Thus, the revisions have not 





We emphasize that Rite Aid and the PPA on this appeal 
have not challenged the substantive impact or results of the 
revised rates as failing to comply with section 30(A). See 
Minnesota Homecare Ass'n Inc. v. Gomez, 108 F.3d 917, 
918 (8th Cir. 1997) (concurring opinion). Rather, they 
challenge the way in which the Department set and 
promulgated the new rates. In particular, they argue that 
the Department (1) failed to comply with section 30(A) 
because section 30(A) mandates that a certain kind of 
process be followed in revising the pharmacy 
reimbursement rates, and (2) acted arbitrarily and 
capriciously in so doing. The district court accepted these 
contentions and thus in this opinion we largely focus on 
these points.7 The parties agree that we exercise plenary 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
7. The Department argues at least in part that Rite Aid and the PPA may 
not sue to enforce the Medicaid regulations as section 30(A) "does not 
support a private cause of action." Brief at 27. The district court 
rejected 
this argument and we agree with this result. Rite Aid, 998 F. Supp. at 
525-26. In the district court Rite Aid argued that "substantively" the SPA 
 
                                12 
  
review over the district court's decision. See Olson v. 
General Elec. Astrospace, 101 F.3d 947, 951 (3d Cir. 1996). 
In this regard, we point out that the district court 
predicated its result, including issuing the injunction, on 
its construction of section 30(A) and its relatedfinding that 
the Department acted arbitrarily and capriciously in 
adopting the revisions, rather than on other equitable 
considerations. See AMP Inc. v. AlliedSignal Corp., 1999 WL 
86843 at *3 (3d Cir. Feb. 18, 1999). Thus, this appeal does 
not require us to review an exercise of discretion. 
 
A. The District Court Properly Confined its Review to the 
       Administrative Record. 
 
Initially, we agree with the district court's determination 
in its May 8, 1998 order to base its decision on the existing 
administrative record. While we are not aware of any court 
that has held specifically that in reviewing section 30(A) 
issues a court must confine itself to the agency's 
administrative record, in general judicial review should be 
on "the administrative record already in existence, not some 
new record made initially in the reviewing court." Camp v. 
Pitts, 411 U.S. 138, 142, 93 S.Ct. 1241, 1244 (1973); C.K. 
v. New Jersey Dep't of Health and Human Servs., 92 F.3d 
171, 182 (3d Cir. 1996).8 Thus, the district court properly 
ruled that it would not create a new record nor base its 
review on any "post-hoc rationalizations" made by the 
Department after it had taken the disputed action. Rite Aid, 
1998 WL 254082 at *1 (citing Citizens to Preserve Overton 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
was invalid because "the revised reimbursement rates are too low to 
satisfy the statutory requirements." Id. At 528. The court, however, 
declined to rule on this contention because it held that a determination 
of "[w]hether the rates are consistent with efficiency, economy, and 
quality of care requires further development of the record." Id. In the 
circumstances, our opinion does not preclude Rite Aid and the PPA from 
making a "substantive" challenge to the revisions. 
 
8. Because the Department participated in an IRRC hearing on 
September 7, 1995, and because regulations were notfinal until they 
were deemed approved on September 8, 1995, the court considered the 
administrative record to include documents before the Secretary through 
that date, a decision not challenged on appeal. 
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Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 419, 91 S.Ct. 814, 825 
(1971)). 
 
B. The District Court Erred in Holding that 30 (A) Imposes 
       a "Procedural" Requirement. 
 
The district court held that section 30(A) imposes a 
"procedural" requirement on state agencies. We disagree 
with the district court on this point, as we conclude that 
section 30(A) mandates only substantive compliance with 
its specified factors of efficiency, economy, quality of care, 
and access. 
 
To date, three courts of appeals have addressed the 
question of whether section 30(A) has a procedural 
requirement. The Courts of Appeals for the Eighth and 
Ninth Circuits have ruled that section 30(A) requires that 
the state agency make some investigation or conduct a 
study. See Arkansas Med. Soc'y, Inc. v. Reynolds, 6 F.3d 
519, 530 (8th Cir. 1993) (Agency "must consider the 
relevant factors of equal access, efficiency, economy, and 
quality of care as designated in [section 30(A)] when setting 
reimbursement rates."); Minnesota HomeCare Ass'n, Inc., 
108 F.3d at 918; Orthopaedic Hosp. v. Belshe, 103 F.3d 
1491 (9th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 118 S.Ct. 684 (1998). 
The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit has held, 
however, that there is no such requirement, but rather that 
section 30(A) requires simply that whatever change is 
adopted produce the substantive results demanded by the 
statute. See Methodist Hosps, Inc. v. Sullivan, 91 F.3d 1026, 
1030 (7th Cir. 1996). 
 
We agree with the Court of Appeals for the Seventh 
Circuit that section 30(A) requires the state to achieve a 
certain result but does not impose any particular method or 
process for getting to that result. Id. Thus, section 30(A) 
does not require any "particular methodology" for satisfying 
its substantive requirements as to modifications of state 
plans.9 However, we will not go as far as did that court as 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
9. The district court believed that its holding was not contrary to that 
of 
the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit's result in Methodist Hosp., 
but its logic seems strained. Rite Aid, 998 F. Supp. at 527. On the one 
hand, the district court observed that the court of appeals held that 
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to say that the Department literally may act like any other 
buyer of health care by offering a certain price, and seeing 
what response or result that price brings forth; that is, that 
the "states may behave like other buyers of goods and 
services in the market: they may say what they are willing 
to pay and see whether this brings forth an adequate 
supply." Id. We decline to adopt that approach because 
ordinarily, at least, a state may not act arbitrarily and 
capriciously, although other actors in the market may do so 
if they so choose. While section 30(A) does not govern the 
process by which it sets its prices, as we explain below 
other doctrines do control that process and protect the 
public from the possible ill effects of an agency testing out 
new formulae or prices at random, then correcting the 
results once a violation has occurred. 
 
The courts of appeals' split thus arises from the question 
whether section 30(A) demands a process which will ensure 
future results, or merely the result itself. In reaching our 
result we will not read procedural criteria into section 
30(A). That section requires that the state "assure" certain 
outcomes, including efficiency, economy, etc., but it does 
not call explicitly for any particular findings. Thus, it is up 
to a state to determine how it will "assure" the outcomes. 
We reiterate that section 30(A) does not specify a particular 
process for a state agency to follow in establishing rates.10 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
section 30(A) does not require "comprehensive studies" such "that would 
put an environmental impact study to shame." Id. (citing Methodist 
Hosp., 91 F.3d at 1029). But the district court asserted that "by this 
language, Methodist does not conclude that 30(A) eliminates any 
mandate for evaluation of the statutory factors before revising the 
rates." 
Id. (citing Methodist Hosp., 91 F.3d at 1030). In fact, Methodist Hosp. 
does eliminate any such mandate: that is why its holding differs from 
those of the Courts of Appeals for the Eighth and Ninth Circuits on this 
point. 
 
10. "Assure" is defined by Black's Law Dictionary as "[t]o make certain 
and put beyond doubt. To . . . ensure positively." Black's Law Dictionary 
123 (6th ed. 1990). Webster's Third New International Dictionary defines 
"assure" similarly as "to make certain the coming or attainment of: 
ensure," in its sixth definition for the term. Webster's Third New 
International Dictionary 133 (1986). 
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What the section does require is that the agency achieve 
proper results in revising its State Plan. 
 
The district court analogized section 30(A) to the Boren 
Amendment, which dealt with reimbursement rates for 
institutional providers under Medicaid, but now has been 
repealed. See 42 U.S.C. S 1396a(a)(13)(A); Rite Aid, 1998 WL 
631996, at *4. The Boren Amendment instructed state 
agencies to make findings and assurances that their 
Medicaid reimbursement rates promote economy, efficiency, 
quality of care, and equal access, 42 U.S.C. 
S 1396a(a)(13)(A),11 and thus, to that extent, it was 
undeniably similar to section 30(A). See Arkansas Med. 
Soc'y, 6 F.3d 519, 524 (noting similarity of function and 
language). But in contrast to section 30(A), the Boren 
Amendment directed the states as to the procedure they 
must follow in formulating a reimbursement rate, 
specifically requiring that states take into account certain 
findings. New Jersey Hosp. Ass'n v. Waldman, 73 F.3d 509, 
513 (3d Cir. 1995). Federal regulations implementing the 
Boren Amendment outline the specific "findings" a state 
agency must make whenever it made "a change in its 
methods and standards." 42 C.F.R. S 447.253(b).12 The 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
11. The Boren Amendment required the Department to set inpatient 
reimbursement rates that "the State finds, and makes assurances 
satisfactory to the Secretary, are reasonable and adequate to meet the 
costs which must be incurred by efficiently and economically operated 
facilities in order to provide care and services . .. and to assure that 
individuals eligible for medical assistance have reasonable access . . . 
to 
inpatient hospital services of adequate quality; and such State makes 
further assurances, satisfactory to the Secretary, for the filing of 
uniform 
cost reports by each hospital . . . and periodic audits by the State of 
such reports." 42 U.S.C. S 1396a(a)(13)(A). 
 
12. The implementing regulations specify that the following findings be 
made: 
 
(b) Findings. Whenever the Medicaid agency makes a change in its 
methods and standards, but not less often then annually, the agency 
must make the following findings: 
 
(1) Payment rates. (i) The Medicaid agency pays for inpatient hospital 
services and long-term care facility services through the use of rates 
that 
are reasonable and adequate to meet the costs that must be incurred by 
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district court noted that section 30(A), unlike the Boren 
Amendment, "does not require the State to utilize any 
prescribed method of analyzing and considering said factors 
[of economy, efficiency, quality of care and access]," and 
that section 30(A) does not require the agency to study any 
"specific" item "such as actual pharmacy costs." Rite Aid, 
1998 WL 631966, at *4 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
We will not read back from section 30(A) to say that the 
section implicitly requires that a state follow a specific 
procedure or demonstrate that it has reviewed each factor. 
Thus, the situation under the Boren Amendment is 
distinguishable from that here. 
 
Rite Aid and the PPA contend in their cross-appeals that 
without knowing pharmacies' costs, the Department could 
not know what price would lead to adequate, quality 
service. See Orthopaedic Hosp., 103 F.3d at 1500 (agency 
must study actual provider costs in revising Medicaid 
payments). Preliminarily, on this issue we point out that 
Rite Aid and PPA are not by their cross-appeals seeking 
additional relief. See United States v. Tabor Court Realty 
Corp., 943 F.2d 335, 342-45 (3d Cir. 1991). Rather, they 
advance the issue as an alternative ground to affirm the 
summary judgment and injunction. University of Md. v. 
Peat Marwick Main & Co., 923 F.2d 265, 275 (3d Cir. 
1991). Thus, we will dismiss the cross-appeals. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
efficiently and economically operated providers to provide services in 
conformity with applicable State and Federal laws, regulations, and 
quality and safety standards. 
 
(ii) With respect to inpatient hospital services-- 
 
(A) The methods and standards used to determine payment rates take 
into account the situation of hospitals which serve a disproportionate 
number of low income patients with special needs;[and] 
 
. . . . 
 
(C) The payment rates are adequate to assure that recipients have 
reasonable access, taking into account geographic location and 
reasonable travel time, to inpatient hospital services of adequate 
quality. 
 
42 C.F.R. S 447.253(b). 
 
                                17 
  
Addressing the point raised in the cross-appeals on the 
merits, we think it consistent with our reading of section 
30(A) that a finding of the pharmacies' costs is not 
mandated: within the agency's discretion, pharmacies' costs 
may be considered or not, so long as its process of 
decision-making is reasonable and sound. Moreover, there 
was evidence that the Department is familiar with 
providers' costs through setting the EAC and the 
dispensing fee, although it did not conduct a special study 
in this case. Thus, we approve the district court's holding 
that the Department was not required to conduct a study 
of actual pharmacy costs before revising the payment 
schedule. Rite Aid, 998 F. Supp. at 527. 
 
C. The District Court Erred in Holding that th e Department 
       was Arbitrary and Capricious. 
 
As we have indicated, the district court, in addition to 
concluding that section 30(A) has a procedural component, 
found that the Department's action in adopting the 
revisions was procedurally arbitrary and capricious. Thus, 
we must make our own determination whether the action 
was arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion, or 
otherwise was not in accordance with law, or if the action 
failed to meet statutory, procedural or constitutional 
requirements. See, e.g., Davis Enterprises v. United States 
Envtl. Protection Agency, 877 F.2d 1181, 1184 (3d Cir. 
1989). We may find that an action is arbitrary and 
capricious if the agency relied on factors other than those 
intended by Congress, did not consider "an important 
aspect" of the issue confronting the agency, provided an 
explanation for its decision which "runs counter to the 
evidence before the agency," or is entirely implausible. See 
Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n of U.S., Inc. v. State Farm Mut. 
Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43, 103 S.Ct. 2856, 2867 
(1983). Our standard of review is narrow. Id. at 43-44, 103 
S.Ct. at 2867. We must "uphold [an agency's] decision of 
less than ideal clarity if the agency's path may reasonably 
be discerned." Id. at 43, 103 S.Ct. at 2867 (internal 
citations omitted). Of course, if a reasonable person could 
rely on the agency's studies to reach its conclusions, the 
conclusions are not arbitrary. 
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The district court found the review arbitrary and 
capricious at least in part because it already had decided, 
incorrectly in our view, that section 30(A) imposed duties 
on the Department to consider how its rates affected the 
section 30(A) factors. Thus, the Department, for example, 
could not rely on some independent guarantee of 
compliance. Rite Aid, 1998 WL 631966, at *5. The district 
court held that while the Department had discretion in how 
to conduct its review, it was obligated to consider all of the 
section 30(A) factors. Id. at *4. 
 
We are aware that Motor Vehicle Mfrs. requires us to 
examine whether the agency has "entirely failed to consider 
an important aspect of the problem," and that each of the 
section 30(A) factors may be considered to be relevant 
issues. Motor Vehicle Mfrs., 463 U.S. at 43, 103 S.Ct. at 
2867. Moreover, we believe that the Department might have 
done a better job in its review by considering systematically 
and thoroughly all the implications of its rate revisions, 
and, as we discuss below, in communicating its thought 
processes and decision to the public and to participants in 
the review. 
 
The Department gave some of the section 30(A) factors 
more attention than others. In particular, it paid greater 
consideration to economy and efficiency than to provision of 
quality of care and access to care providers comparable to 
that enjoyed by the general population. Cuts in Medicaid 
funding have enormous implications for the well being of 
some of Pennsylvania's most vulnerable people, and the 
pharmacy community is correct in pointing out that profit 
margins are already small for many of its members. 
Nevertheless, given our deferential and narrow standard of 
review, we find that the Department did not arbitrarily and 
capriciously decide to use AWP-10%, FULs and BaseLine 
Prices for ingredient costs and to raise the dispensing fee 
by $0.50. 
 
The district court relied upon three aspects of the 
Department's review of data in holding that the 
Department's review was arbitrary and capricious with 
respect to the section 30(A) factors of efficiency, economy, 
and quality of care. Rite Aid, 1998 WL 631966, at *4-*8. 
Concluding that it was arbitrary and capricious with regard 
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to those factors, it did not reach the comparable access 
factor, id. at *10, although the parties have briefed it 
extensively.13 First, the court noted a statement made in 
January 1995 by then-Secretary of Public Welfare, Karen 
Snider, who wrote to a state senator and referred to 
discounted AWP rates used by other third-party payors as 
"prearranged and arbitrary." Id. at *5. Because the 
Department used such "prearranged and arbitrary" rates as 
a basis for deciding to lower its rates to Medicaid providers, 
the district court concluded that its decision was arbitrary, 
reasoning that the fact that pharmacies had accepted those 
rates did not mean that the Department could conclude 
that the rates satisfied the section 30(A) factors of efficiency 
and economy. Id. The Department points out, however, that 
the Secretary's reference was to industry-wide practices, 
and occurred in the context of noting that Medicaid 
payments exceeded those of other prescription plans. Brief 
at 35-36. 
 
Second, the district court asserted that the Department's 
comparisons with other states' reimbursement rates was 
unacceptable because, as the HCFA itself had cautioned in 
a statement to the Department, what is reasonable in one 
state may not be reasonable for Pennsylvania's needs. Rite 
Aid, 1998 WL 631966, at *5. The Department relied on the 
HCFA's approval of rates paid in other states as evidence 
that those rates conformed with the section 30(A) 
requirements. The district court recognized that 
Pennsylvania could review other states' payments as a 
basis for determining its own payments, yet held that it 
could not conclude that its payments for brand name drugs 
would be "economical and efficient because of data from 
other states." Rite Aid, 1998 WL 631966, at *5. 
 
Last, the court singled out Concino's cost studies on 
select generic and brand name drugs. Under the revised 
regulations, reimbursement for generic drugs is predicated 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
13. The district court did not reach the access issue, concluding that 
such review was unnecessary, but it appears that the Department 
viewed access largely in terms of whether there would be an adequate 
number of pharmacies serving Medicaid clients, not whether Medicaid 
clients had the same or better access than the general population. 
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either on the FUL or on the private services's guidelines. Id. 
at * 6. The district court stated that adoption of the FULs 
for generic drugs in itself does not ensure efficiency and 
economy, and that the Department would "have to evaluate 
the rates for the remaining generic drugs [not covered by a 
FUL] as well as all of the brand name drugs." Id. The 
district court referred to several criticisms of Concino's 
price surveys, and Rite Aid and the PPA expand on them in 
their briefs. Among other issues, Rite Aid and the PPA 
complain that the drug sample of eight brand name and 15 
generic drugs was too small, these neither were selected 
randomly nor representative, the pricing data did not come 
from the pharmacies, and Medicaid payment involves 
variables not at issue with reimbursement by private plans. 
See Brief at 27-29. 
 
While Rite Aid and the PPA contend that a better survey 
and analysis of the drug market and the State's place in it 
could have been done, those deficiencies do not make the 
overall process arbitrary and capricious. See Methodist 
Hosp., 91 F.3d at 1029-30. (difficulties of gathering data for 
and creating comprehensive study of major segment of 
market). The district court's criticism of the price survey led 
to its conclusion that the Department behaved arbitrarily 
and capriciously in part because the court already had 
concluded that "the Department may not rely on its third- 
party payor survey or its evaluation of other states' rates." 
Rite Aid, 1998 WL 631966, at *7. We find, however, that the 
Department's study, which included data about other 
states and payors, supported its revision. While we doubt 
that a rational person would rely on the Concino study 
alone to reach the Department's decision, the Department 
has shown that by considering the study and other sources 
of information, it made a reasonable effort to anticipate the 
effects of its action. 
 
The district court held that it was unreasonable for the 
Department to rely upon laws or regulations which 
independently ensure quality care, finding that the 
Department under section 30(A) had an obligation to 
consider the impact of rate changes on quality of care. Rite 
Aid, 1998 WL 631966, at * 8. But we find that it was 
reasonable for the Department to consider the statutory 
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guarantees of quality of care and the necessity for the IRRC 
to approve the changes as being in the public interest, as 
valid evidence suggesting that pharmacies operating under 
the rate revisions would have to provide quality care. Cf. 
Orthopaedic Hosp. v. Belshe, 103 F.3d at 1497 (requiring 
agency to satisfy for itself maintenance of quality of care). 
 
The Department's finding that at least 40 states 
discounted AWP by, on average, 10%, and that the eight 
large, non-government plans studied discounted AWP by at 
least 10% and, in some cases, discounted AWP by even a 
higher percentage, supported its determination that AWP- 
10% would allow pharmacies to maintain provision of care 
and earn a profit. Furthermore, the plans paid lower 
dispensing fees than the $3.50 previously offered by the 
Department. Thus, the Department was aware that with the 
revised rates, Pennsylvania's program would pay more than 
most states and more than those of other major 
Pennsylvania payors. 
 
Regarding the dispensing fee, the question is whether the 
Department was irrational in raising its fee by less than 
what the pharmacies sought, or whether it should have 
researched this change more thoroughly before the 
revision's promulgation. We find that the Department took 
into account and considered various suggestions as to what 
the fee ought be, and that it selected the increase 
considering that it would keep Pennsylvania's payments 
higher than those of other third-party payors. Although 
budgetary considerations may not be the sole basis for a 
rate revision, they may be considered given that section 
30(A) mandates an economical result. See, e.g., Arkansas 
Med. Soc'y, 6 F.3d at 530. 
 
D. The District Court Did Not Err in Holding that the 
       Department Failed to Consult with the MAAC. 
 
The Department had a duty under 42 C.F.R. S 431.12 to 
consult with the Pennsylvania MAAC during its review 
process. 42 C.F.R. S 431.12(e) (State MAAC "must have 
opportunity for participation in policy development and 
program administration."). The district court concluded that 
the Department did not fulfill that duty, but did not 
determine whether that failure alone would support the 
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issuance of an injunction, as it determined to enjoin the 
application of the revision because it perceived that the 
Department failed to comply with section 30(A) and acted 
arbitrarily and capriciously. Rite Aid, 1998 WL 631966, at 
*10. We agree that the Department did not comply with its 
duty to consult adequately with the MAAC, but find that 
the violation cannot support the injunction.14 
 
The Department met with the MAAC on October 25, 
1994, but the revisions subsequently adopted in 1995 
differed from those presented at that meeting. The MAAC 
did not meet again until September 28, 1995, after the 
revisions' promulgation, and the MAAC pharmacy 
subcommittee did not meet again until December 1995. The 
Department's discussions with individual members of the 
subcommittee during that time did not satisfy its duty to 
consult with the MAAC during the review. Indeed, Richard 
Lee, Acting Deputy of the Department, conceded in July 
1995, just before the Secretary sent the revised rates to the 
IRRC for review, that "the process [of consultation with the 
MAAC] got out of channel during the discussion, and the 
regulations were not discussed directly with the Pharmacy 
Subcommittee." Minutes of the MAAC Meeting, July 27, 
1995. We recognize that 42 C.F.R. S 431.12(e) requires 
"participation" and not "approval," but the October 1994 
consultation involved the earlier version of rates, which had 
been modified significantly by September 1995. 
 
The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit has noted that 
case law under 42 C.F.R. S 431.12(e) "suggests that States 
should undertake their MAAC consultations as early in the 
Plan amendment process as practicable, preferably before 
any final decision on proposed changes to their 
reimbursement methodologies," though "the HCFA 
regulations prescribe no time bar for the recommended 
MAAC consultation," and that it is reasonable to think that 
"MAAC consultation is sufficient as along as it occurs 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
14. Rite Aid and the PPA raise this issue on their cross-appeals. As we 
have explained, they should have advanced the issue as an alternative 
basis to affirm. The Department contends that 42 C.F.R. S 431.12 is not 
privately enforceable but we agree with the district court that it is. 
Rite 
Aid, 998 F. Supp. at 525-26. 
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before final HCFA approval of the Plan amendment." 
Visiting Nurse Ass'n of North Shore, Inc. v. Bullen, 93 F.3d 
997, 1010 n.14 (lst Cir. 1996). Here, while there was early 
consultation, there was no further consultation prior to 
final approval. Furthermore, the Department itself 
recognized that the review process had bypassed 
consultation with the MAAC. 
 
However, this violation cannot supply a basis to sustain 
the injunction. In Burgess v. Affleck, 683 F.2d 596, 599- 
600 (1st Cir. 1982), the Court of Appeals for the First 
Circuit found a case of "borderline" compliance with the 
MAAC regulation, but held that as the MAAC's involvement 
was advisory and it had no veto power, an injunction was 
not an appropriate remedy. Therefore, it reversed the 
district court's grant of an injunction entered on that basis, 
finding that relief at best would involve requiring 
consultation with the MAAC before implementation of 
revisions. Here, too, we think the violation is"not 
egregious," id., and that it would not be appropriate to 
sustain the district court's injunction on the basis of the 42 
C.F.R. S 431.12 violation. 
 
E. The District Court Erred in Holding that the Department 
       Violated 42 C.F.R. S 447.205 (c). 
 
The district court held that the Department violated 42 
C.F.R. S 447.205(c) by failing to "[i]dentify a local agency in 
each county . . . where copies of the proposed changes are 
available for public review." Rite Aid, 998 F. Supp. at 530. 
The first question on this point is whether the Department's 
August 25, 1995 notice constitutes published notice of a 
"proposed" change. See 25 Pa. Bull. 3540 (Aug. 26, 1995). 
The August 25, 1995 notice stated that the Department 
"will amend" the reimbursement rates, and gave a synopsis 
of the changes. Id. In order to determine whether the 
Department thus had announced a proposed change, the 
court framed the question as whether on that date the rates 
were final or not, as the Department's own public comment 
period had ended by August 25, 1995. Moreover, the rates 
already had been submitted to the IRRC for approval, 
though they were not yet approved. The court properly 
concluded that, as the IRRC had its own public comment 
period, and the rate change was subject to ultimate 
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approval by the IRRC, the notice was not final, although the 
agency had determined what it wished the rates to be. Rite 
Aid, 998 F. Supp. at 528-29. Because the notice preceded 
the effective date, we agree that the changes were 
"proposed" and public comment would not have been futile. 
 
The second question is whether the content of the August 
25, 1995 notice of proposed changes was sufficient. The 
district court simply concluded that "[n]otifying readers 
about another location where they can read the same notice 
is not sufficient." Id. at 530. Wefind that the availability of 
the same notice itself in local agencies satisfied the 
regulation, as it contained sufficient information and detail 
for public consideration. Burgess, 683 F.2d at 602. Clearly, 
though, the Department did the bare minimum to meet its 
duty in this regard. 
 
Finally, Rite Aid and the PPA argue that the Department 
failed to provide 60 days of public comment on the 
"proposed" rates before changing the rates, as required by 
55 Pa. Code S 1101.70. Federal law no longer requires a 60- 
day period between proposal notice and the effective date of 
the rate change. See 46 Fed. Reg. 58677 (Dec. 3, 1981). 
The district court properly rejected the contention that it 
should incorporate Pennsylvania's law into the federal 
public notice requirement, because the state agency had 
not expressed its clear intent to do so. Rite Aid, 998 F. 
Supp. at 529-30. See Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians 




Because we hold that section 30(A) does not include 
procedural requirements, and because the Department's 
11-month period of data gathering, consultation, and 
review before promulgating the changes was not so 
deficient as to be arbitrary and capricious, we will reverse 
the district court's grant of partial summary judgment to 
Rite Aid, and vacate the injunction. The deficiencies we 
have identified in the Department's procedures do not 
justify a different result. We will dismiss Rite Aid's and the 
PPA's cross-appeals because they are unwarranted 
procedurally and in any event are without merit. We will 
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remand the case to the district court for further 
proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
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